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CHAP. T E R 3 
Insurance Law 
JOHN G. RYAN* 
A. CouRT DECISIONs 
§3.1. "No-Fault" Insurance: Recovery for Pain and Suffering. 
During the 1975 Survey year, the Supreme JudiCialCourt was presented 
with its third opportunity to determine the applicability and constitution-
ality of the restriction on recovery of damages for pain and· suffering 
found in section 6D of chapter 231 of the General Laws.1 
In Cyr v. Farias, 2 the Supreme Judicial Court held that the section 
6D restrictions are applicable to nonresident plaintiffs;3 In Cyr, two 
nonresident plaintiffs, husband and wife, sought direct and conse-
quential damages, including damages for pain and suffering for in-
juries incurred in an accident that occurred upon the ways of the 
Commonwealth. 4 · 
Plaintiffs were residents of ·Rhode Island, traveling in their own 
vehicle registered in that state at the time of the· accident. 5 The de-
fendant was a domiciliary of Massachusetts insured by a compulsory 
Massachusetts policy containing "no-fault" provisions in accordance 
with sections 34A-340 of chapter 90 ofthe General Laws. 6 
Neither plaintiff had incurred expenses in excess of $500 nor suf-
fered any of the five types of injury listed in section 6D of chapter 
231,7 which overcome the statute's bar to recoveries for pain and 
*JOHN G. RYAN is a former Commissioner of Insurance for the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts. He is currently Vice President, Public Affairs, Commercial Union Assur-
ance Companies: 
§ 3.1. 1 The prior cases were Chtpman v. MBTA, 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1447, 316 
N.E.2d 725 and Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1, 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971). 
2 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1508, 327 N.E.2d 890. 
3 Id. at 1511, 327 N.E.2d at 892. 
4 Id. at 1508-09, 327 N.E.2d at 891. 
5 Id. at 1509, 327 N.E.2d at 891. 
8 Id. The original "no-fault" legislation is Acts of 1970, c. 670. 
7 The types of injury are (1) those that cause death, (2) those that consist in whole or 
in part of loss of a body member, (3) those that consist in whole or in .part of permanent 
and serious disfigurement, (4) a fracture, or (5) those that res~lt in loss.~f sight or J:tear-
ing as defined in G.L. c. 152, § 36, G.L. c. 231, § 6D. . · 
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suffering.8 Nevertheless, the district court award~~ the plaintiffs 
$5,872, which included $4,500 for pain and suffering.9 On review, the 
appellate division held that the case was governed by section 6D of 
chapter 231, found that the language was "clear and unequivocal" and 
concluded, therefore, that plaintiffs could not recotr for pain and 
suffering.10 Plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme judi "al Court raising 
two questions: (1) whether the provisions of section 6 of chapter 231 
apply to injured plaintiffs who are nonresidents not covered by "no-
fault" benefits; and (2) whether denial of damages for pain and suf-
fering. caused to nonresidents by a negligent Massac!setts driver vio-
lates either the due process or the equal protection uarantees of the 
United States and Massachusetts Constitutions.U 
The breadth of the statute's exclusion of recovery or pain and suf-
fering in "any action of tort" has been a subject of speculation since 
the "no-fault" law12 was first enacted. Two prior decisions of the 
Court13 led many to speculate that, faced with the qtestion of its ap-
plicability to the nonresident plaintiff, the Court wo ld1 read the ex-
clusion "in light of its purpose as an adjunct to the 'no-fa It' statute"14 and 
hold that it did not apply where a plaintiff did not benefit from the 
"no-fault" guarantee of medical and wage loss recoveries. 15 
In the first of these decisions, Pinnick 'II. Cleary, 18 !e Court turned 
aside a "multi-faceted attack." on the "no-fault" law1 shor. tly afte.r it 
became effective. In reaching its decision, the Court pplied a twofold 
test to the due process queslion: "the general test required by the due 
process clause of whether it bears a rational relation to a legitimate 
legislative objective, and the more particularized test ... [of] whether 
it provides a reasonable substitute for pre-existin~ rights."18 The 
"reasonable substitute" test applied in Pinnick was ba ed upon an ear-
lier workmen's compensation case, New York Cen al R.R. Co. v. 
White,t 9 in which the Uni~d States Supreme Court suggested that a 
state might not have the power under the due process clause to "sud-
denly set aside all common law rules respecting lial?ility as between 
employer and employee, without providing a reasoqably just substi-
tute .... "20 
8 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1509, 327 N.E.2d at 891. 
9 I d. 
10 Id. at 1510, 327 N.E.2d at 891-92. 
11 Id. at 1510-11, 327 N.E.2d at 892. 
11 Acts of 1970, c. 670. 
13 Chipman v. MBTA, 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1447, 316 N.E.2d 725; Pinnick v. Cleary, 
360 Mass. 1, 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971). 
14 See, e.g., Smith, Torts, 1974 ANN. SuRv. MAss. LAw§ 6.9, at 121. 
15 ld. 
18 360 Mass. 1, 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971). 
17 Jd. at 2, 271 N.E.2d at 595. 
18 Id. at 16, 271 N.E.2d at 602. 
19 243 o.s. 188 (1971). 
10 I d. at 201. 
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In its discussion of White, the Supreme Judicial Court noted that 
under workmen's compensation statutes, an employee who is injured 
or killed in the course of his or her employment is entitled to "a fixed 
compensation ... without regard to fault in almost every case."21 In 
contrast, an employee who succeeded in making out a case under the 
common law "stood to gain a great deal more from a jury than he 
would receive under workmen's compensation."22 At the same time, 
however, the employee was not guaranteed recovery under the com-
mon law: his rights against the employer were circumscribed by cer-
tain defenses.23 Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court in 
White had suggested that such an exchange of rights was adequate: 
"[I]f the employee is no longer able to recover as much as before ... 
he is entitled to moderate compensation in all cases of injury, and has 
a certain and speedy remedJ without the difficulty and expense of es-
tablishing negligence .... "2 
The Supreme Judicial Court in Pinnick, which involved two Mass-
achusetts motorists, 25 applied the White rationale in finding valid the 
restriction of section 6D of chapter 231 of the General Laws.26 The 
Court noted that the statutory restriction resulted in the following bene-
fits to the negligent Massachusetts driver: (1) premium savings; (2) the 
assurance of the "no-fault" benefits; and (3) the avoidance of the un-
certainty, delay, and cost of a tort action. 27 Therefore, the Court con-
cluded: "[T]he effect [of the 'no-fault' law] on Massachusetts motorists 
... is to provide benefits in return for affected rights at least as ade-
quate as those provided to New York employers and employees in re-
turn for rights taken by the [workmen's compensation] act in the 
White case."28 
The Court in Pinnick went further, observing that even for non-
car-owning pedestrians the statute provides a reasonable substitute for 
pre-existing rights: the "certainty of prompt recovery of a limited 
amount and limited exemption from liability instead of the necessity 
of tort proceedings or no compensation at all and liability to an unlimited 
amount."29 Nevertheless, on each of the two occasions in which the Court 
in Pinnick discussed the "reasonable and adequate substitute test," it took 
pains to suggest that the test might not be constitutionally required.30 The 
Court's decision in Cyr soon demonstrated the wisdom of these caveats. 
Pinnick did not deal with the application of section 6D of chapter 
231 to nonresident motorists, a question raised in Cyr. However, in 
21 360 Mass. at 16, 271 N .E.2d at 606. 
22 Jd. at 21-22, 271 N.E.2d at 606. 
23 Id. at 22, 271 N.E.2d at 606. 
24 White, 243 U.S. at 201. 
25 360 Mass. at 3-4, 271 N.E.2d at 595. 
28 /d. at 22-23, 271 N .E.2d at 606. 
21 Jd. at 22, 271 N.E.2d at 606. 
28 Id. at 23, 271 N.E.2d at 607. 
29 I d. at 24, 271 N.E.2d at 607. 
30 See 360 Mass. at 15,21 n.16, 271 N.E.2d at 602,605 n.16. 
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the 1974 decision Chipman v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation 
Authority, 31 the Court sustained lower court awards of damages for 
pain and suffering on the theory that a plaintiff denied the benefits 
of prompt recovery of limited amounts ought not to be exposed to 
the burden of a reduced recovery.32 Thus, the Coul seemed to sug-
gest that it would narrow the interpretation of sec ion 6D in cases 
where a plaintiff was not entitled to "no-fault" perso al injury protec-
tion benefits. · 
The plaintiff in Chipman, a non-car-owning pedest ian, was injured 
by the negligence of the defendant public authority, 3 which was ex-
pressly exempted from the insurance requirements of chapter 90 of 
the General Laws. 34 The defendant contended that it was entitled to 
the benefits of the exemption from liability for pain and suffering, 
even though, as a public authority, it was not required to provide the 
"no-fault" protection.35 The Court, citing Pinnick, reasoned that a 
principal purpose of the Massachusetts "no-fault" legislation was the 
reduction of the liability insurance costs of motor tehicle owners.36 
Since the public authority was a self-insurer, "its ex!rience ha[d] no 
effect whatsoever on liability insurance rates .... "3 Therefore, the 
Court in Chipman concluded that the plaintiffs right to recovery was 
not affected by the "no-fault" provisions, including t e pain and suf-
fering exemption.38 
Furthermore, the Court in Chipman emphasized that if the plaintiff 
were to be denied recovery of damages, he would not receive in re-
turn the benefits of personal injury protection. 39 The Court then sug-
gested that "any interpretation which would bar this plaintiff from re-
covering for pain and suffering would raise doubts as to the constitu-
tionality of at least one aspect of the no-fault scheme.j'40 
Since the Court in Pinnick and Chipman did not de~ide whether the 
"reasonable and adequate substitute test" is constitutiqnally required,41 
Cyr is of special interest. The Court in Cyr ignored ~hat possible due 
process issue, focusing instead entirely on the due process inquiry 
whether the legislative scheme bears a "reasonable relation to a legiti-
31 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1447, 316 N.E.2d 725. For a discussion of Chipman, see Smith, 
Torts, 1974 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW§ 6.9, at 119-20, and Ryan ,Insurance Law, 1974 ANN. SURV. 
MASS. LAW.§ 8.5, at 159 .. 
321974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1452, 316 N.E.2d at 728. 
33 Id. at 1448, 316 N.E.2d at 726. 
34 G.L. c. 90, § 1A. . 
30 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1451-52, 316 N.E.2d at 728. i 
38 Id. at 1452, 316 N.E.2d at 728, citing Pinnick, 360 Mass. 1, 20, 2711 N.E.2d 592, 604-05 
(1971). ! 
37 Id. at 1452, 316 N.E.2d at 728. I 
38 Id. at 1452-53, 316 N.E.2d at 728. 
38 Id. at 1453, 316 N.E.2d at 729. 
40 I d. at 1453, 316 N.E.2d at 728. 
41 See Chipman, 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1453, 316 N.E.2d at 728; Pinnick, 360 Mass. at 
15, 21 n.16, 271 N.E.2d at 602, 605 n.16. 
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mate objective"42 and the corollary equal protection question whether 
the classifications "bear a rational relationship to a proper legislative 
objective."43 The Court in Cyr upheld the appellate divis10n's denial of 
pain and suffering damages to plaintiffs on those grounds.44 The de-
cision is consistent with the Court's warning in Pinnick that the 
"reasonable and adequate substitute" test might not be constitutionally 
required.45 If, as it appears, this is a departure from Chipman's dicta 
on the constitutionality of the restriction as applied to P.ersons not en-
titled to "no-fault" payments,46 it sets the stage for simdar decisions in 
cases involving pedestrians, those entitled to workmen's compensation 
benefits, and persons affected by deductibles. 
On a more long-range basis, the Cyr decision seems to point to the 
Court's acceptance of.various legislative restrictions on prior rights that 
are not accompanied by a "reasonable and adequate substitute," so long as 
the restrictions are reasonably related to a legitimate purpose. Thus, 
restrictions on tort rights in medical malpractice or in products liability 
cases,47 which might otherwise have been thought impermissible in view 
of Pinnick and Chipman, may soon receive legislative consideration. The 
Court has, however, again left the constitutional issue open by its em-
phasis in Cyr on the limited nature of the pain and suffering restriction. 
§3.2. Property Protection Insurance: Interinsurer Subrogation. In 
two companion cases decided during the Survey year, the Supreme Judi-
cial Court was called upon to interpret the provisions of section 340 of 
chapter 90 of the General Laws, the so-called "no-fault property damage 
law,"1 which was designed to bring the ultimate costs of losses back to the 
party at fault. 
In Lumbetmens Mutual Casualty Corp. v. Bay State Truck Lease, Inc., 2 a 
commercial leasing company that was the obligor on a motor vehicle 
liability bond challenged the provisions of chapter 903 of the General 
Laws, which allow an insurer, after paying a property damage claim 
to its own insured, to recover through "interinsurer subrogation" 
against the insurer of the party at fault. 4 The defendant contended that: 
( 1) it was not an "insurer" within the meaning of the statute; and (2) in any 
42 The Court disposed of this due process issue by quoting from Pinnick, 1975 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. at 1513-14, 327 N.E.2d at 893. 
43 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1514-16, 327 N.E.2d at 893-94. 
44 Jd. at 1516, 327 N.E.2d at 894. 
4
" 360 Mass. at 15, 271 N.E.2d at 602. 
48 See text at note 30 supra. . · 
47 For an example of current interest in this subject, see O'Connell, An Elective No-Fault 
Liability Statute, INS. L. J., May, 1975, No. 628, at 261. 
§ 3.2. 'G.L. c. 90, § 340. 
2 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 241, 322 N.E.2d 737. 
3 G.L. c. 90, § 340. The following cases arose under § 340 as amended through Acts of 
1971, c. 1079, §§ 2, 3. All references to§ 340 in this section are to this amended ver-
sion of the statute. 
4 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 243, 322 N.E.2d at 738. 
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event, it could not be compelled to arbitrate the disp te. 5 
The Court in Lumbermens found that the obligor as an "insurer" 
within the meaning of the statute. 8 In reaching its de · ion, the Court 
reasoned that to allow an obligor to avoid "interins rer" liability by 
electing to furnish a bond rather than purchasing nsurance would 
thwart the legislative purpose of similar treatment of those furnishing 
bonds and those purchasmg liability policies. 7 Furthe ore, the Court 
emphasized that, under the bond, the obligor bore prim ry responsibility 
for paying losses and defending claims, which are the traditional func-
tions of an insurer.8 
In Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Seaboard S rety Co., 9 a com-
panion case to Lumbermens, an insurer asserted its s brogation claim 
against the surety on the bond, rather than the obli r.10 The Court 
reached the same result, finding that the language of the statute11 
clearly indicated that a surety was intended to treated as an 
"insurer. "12 
Of more substance were the contentions of the oblig r in Lumbermens 
and the surety in Hartford, that, on one hand, they were ot compelled by 
the statute to arbitrate and that, on the other, if they w re so compelled 
the statute violated their rights to a trial by jury.13 T e basis for their 
contention that the statute did not compel arbitration o the dispute was 
that the relevant provisions of the General Laws on a itration14 apply 
only where the claim for arbitration is based upon a writ en agreement. 15 
Reasoning that the purpose of the provision was "to ac ieve prompt and 
economical interinsurer settlement of certain claims " the Court in 
Lumbermens held that the reference in section 340 was " n incorporation 
of the procedures of [the] arbitration statute ... but notl ... a grant to an 
insurer of the option whether to participate .... "16 
Finally, the Court held that the establishment of a~bitration as the 
5 ld. Section 340 provides, inter alia, for arbitration when insure~ cannot agree as to 
which insurer is entitled to recover expenses for which subrogati~n is sought. G.L. c. 
90, § 340. ' 
8 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 244, 322 N.E.2d at 738. 
7 I d. at 244, 322 N .E.2d at 739. 
8 I d. at 244, 322 N .E.2d at 738. 
8 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 247, 322 N.E.2d 739. 
10 Id. at 247, 322 N.E.2d at 740. 
11 G.L. c. 90, § 340. 
11 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 250, 322 N.E.2d at 741. The statute rovided: "Every in-
surer issuing or executing a motor vehicle liability policy or bon shall also provide 
property protection coverage for the policyholder or obligor." G.L. . 90, § 340. 
13 Lumbermens, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 244, 245, 322 N.E.2d at 739; Hartford, 1975 
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 249, 322 N.E.2d at 740-41. Since these issu s were decided in 
Lumbmnens, they were not discussed further in Hartford. See Hartfi , 1975 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. at 249, 322 N.E.2d at 740-41. 
14 G.L. c. 251. 
11 Lumbermens, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 244-45, 322 N.E.2d at 739. 
18 /d. at 245, 322 N.E.2d at 739. 
6
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1975 [1975], Art. 7
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1975/iss1/7
§3.3 INSURANCE LAW 55 
procedure by which interinsurer subrogation clai~s would be handled 
did not violate the obligor's right to trial by jury.17 In reaching its de-
cision, the Court cited earlier opinions involving the Massachusetts 
workmen's compensation law, in which the Court held that the rights 
of parties who are subject to an act that creates procedures of its own 
are to be determined under those procedures, rather than under the 
common law. 18 The Court then reasoned that by choosing to furnish 
a bond, the obligor had, in effect elected to become a "self-insurer."19 
The Court concluded, therefore, that the obligor was bound to accept 
all the consequences of that election.20 Since both the property protec-
tion act and the workmen's compensation act eliminate liability of the 
tortfeasor, the Court's application of the principle to the property 
protection act would appear to be sound. · 
B. LEGISLATION 
§3.3. Medical Malpractice. The most significant insurance legis-
lation enacted during the Survey year is chapter 362 of the Acts of 197 5, 
entitled "An Act Relative to Medical Malpractice."1 The Act addresses 
what is, by any test, clearly the year's most visible sociolegal issue. 
Massachusetts is one of 25 states in the United States that had 
enacted, as of June 30, 1975, laws affecting the insurance arrange-
ments by which physicians, hospitals, and other health care providers 
are protected against professional liability claims, and modifying tort 
laws and procedures.2 The Massachusetts Act is a legislative attempt 
to control the claims explosion that led to general unavailability of 
malpractice co~erage. 
The Act attacks the problem in two ways. For insurers, the most impor-
tant sections are those creating a temporary, joint underwriting 
association3 and those affecting the rates that can be charged.4 
Section 6 of the Act5 creates a joint underwriting association "to 
provide medical malpractice insurance on a self-supporting basis." 
17 Id. 
18 Id. See Opinion of the Justices, 309 Mass. 562, 569-70, 35 N.E.2d 1, 4-5 (1941); 
Opinion of the Justices, 309 Mass. 571, 601-02, 34 N.E.2d 527, 545-46 (1941). 
19 Lumbermens, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 245-46, 322 N.E.2d at 739. 
20 Jd. at 246, 322 N.E.2d at 739. 
§ 3.3. 1 Acts of 1975, c. 362 [hereinafter cited as "the Act"]. 
2 A comparison of malpractice legislation in these states is available at a nominal cost 
from the American Insurance Association, 85 John St., N.Y., N.Y. 10038, in the form 
of two charts entitled "Comparative Analysis of Legislative Changes Related to Medical 
Malpractice." Chart I covers medical malpractice insurance availability plans; Chart II 
covers tort law and procedural changes. 
3 Acts of 1975, c. 362, §§ 6, 13. Sections 4, 6, and 12 of the Act took effect June 19, 
1975. The remainder of the Act took effect Jan. 1, 1976. I d. § 13. 
• I d. § 7, adding G.L. c. 17 5A, § 5A note. 
5 I d. § 6, adding G.L. c. 17 5A, § 5A note. 
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The association is, temporary: section 6 of the Act eipires December 
31, 1977.6 All insurance companies writing any type of personal in-
jury ~iai;>ility insurance in t~e ~?mmo_nwealth are· reqJ,lired to join ~he 
assoctatton. Nevertheless,·· mdtVIdual msurers who cHoose to provide 
coverage directly may continue to do so. Applicants whom individual 
insurers are unwilling to insure will ·be able to obtai~ coverage up to 
the statutory limit ·of $1,000,000 for each claimant u der the policy in 
any one year and $3,000,000 for all claimants under he policy in any 
one year through the pooling mechanism. 7 Insurers with experience 
in providing malpractice coverag. e will act as .servicin~ carriers, issuing 
policies and handling claims on behalf of the associatipn. 
The underlying concept of the association is that all ·insurers will 
share, in proportion to their total writings of any kind of personal in-
jury liability insurance in the state, in .. the financial backing of the 
mechanism that will provide coverage. Since, histotically, the great 
bulk of insurers have not been interested. in providing medical mal-
practice coverage, one effect of the Act is to expos.e many insurers. to 
losses their managemer;tts would not otherwise accept. The Act, how-
ever, attempts to provide assurance to carriers that the plan will ~ot 
operate at a deficit. Thus, the Act permits "recoupment" by the as- . ~ 
sociation through either an assessment on policyho~ders, "a rate ;.,. 
crease applicable prospectively," or both. Furthermore,! under the Act no 
member may be required to pay ','in any one year" more than 1 percent of 
its surplus to policyholders as the member's share of th,e association's 
prerecoupment deficit. In addition to its loss limitation. Rrov ..isions, section. 
::-; of the Act provides that "any profit ... shall be added[ to the reserves of 
the association or retut:ned to the policy holders as a divtdend." Thus, the 
association that the Act establishes is designed to operate on a strict 
break-even basis. . -1 
The rating provisions of section 7 of the Act8 fadilitate the break-
even concept . by :requiring the Commissioner,. of Insurance. to fix and 
establish the maximum permissible rates in much the lsame way that he 
establishes compulsory auto insurance rates. 9 Section 7 of the Act also 
contains provisions analogous to those dealing wit& auto insurance 
rates, 10 requiring the return of any ''unfair profits',' earned by insurers. 11 
The most significant aspect of the Act for practitioners is its creation in 
. . I 
8 Acts of 1975, c. 362, § 13. . · . 
7 ld. The Act provides for a maximum coverage for. hospitals of$10,000,000 for all 
claimants under one policy in any one,year. Id. 
8 I d. § 7, adding G.L. c. 175A, § 5A note. 
9 Id. See also G,L. c. 175, § 1 J3B. 
10 See Acts of 1973, c. 1113. , 
• 
11 Acts of 1975, c. 362, § 7, adding .G.L. c. 175A, § 5A note. Si~e this section relates 
to "earnings realized ... from medical malpractice.insu. ranee polic es issued m; executed 
in the Commonwealth ... ," it apparently applies to . "unfair rofits" earned both 
through voluntary writing or through the association. Id. 
8
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1975 [1975], Art. 7
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1975/iss1/7
§3.3 INSURANCE LAW 57 
section 512 of a screening "tribunal" to determine if the evidence that 
might be substantiated "is sufficient to raise a legitimate question of 
liability appropriate for judicial inquiry." The "tribunal" is to consist of a 
superior court judge, a physician or other representative of the field of 
medicine to which the defendant belongs, and an attorney. Under section 
5 of the Act, the plaintiff in any action "for malpractice, error or mistake 
against a provider of health care" must present to the tribunal an "offer of 
proof' from which the quality of the case can be judged. If the tribunal 
finds that the case is suitable for judicial inquiry, it proceeds. If, however, 
the tribunal finds for the defendant, the plaintiff, unless he is found to be 
indigent, is required to post a bond of $2,000. The plaintiff may then 
pursue the claim through the normaljudicial process. 13 In the event the 
plaintiff does not ultimately prevail, the bond is payable to the defendant 
"for costs assessed, including witness and experts fees and attorneys fees 
" 
It is apparent that the purpose of the "tribunal" is to discourage 
frivolous malpractice actions. There is, however, little evidence that 
frivolous actions have been a source of difficulty in the malpractice 
area. Thus, the efficacy of this reform is doubtful. 
Other provisions of the Act eliminate the ad damnum clause from 
malpractice pleadings, 14 shorten the statute of limitations for 
minors, 15 and allow the trial judge to order an impartial medical ex-
amination of the claimant or expert examination of any relevant 
evidentiary matter. 16 The Act also contains provisions affecting the 
licensing and qualifications of physicians. 17 Finally, the Act establishes 
a special commission to make a study of the malpractice problem. 18 
On balance, the Massachusetts reforms appear to be relatively 
modest. 19 Since the basic reforms in the tort area and in the qualifica-
tions of physicians did not become effective until January 1, 1976, 
there was at the time this article was prepared little evidence as to 
whether or not the reforms will help to control the claims explosion 
that led to the general unavailability of coverage. 
12 Acts of 1975, c. 362, § 5, adding G.L. c. 231, § 60B. 
13 /d. In the event the bond is not posted within thirty days of the tribunal's findings, 
the action will be dismissed. /d. 
14 /d. § 5, adding G.L. c. 231, § 60C. 
15 /d. § 5, adding G.L. c. 231, § 60D. 
16 /d. § 5, adding G.L. c. 231, § 60E. 
17 /d. § 1, amending G.L. c. 13, § 10; § 2, amending G.L. c. 112, § 2; and§ 3, amending 
G.L. c. 112, § 5. 
18 Acts of 1975, c. 362, § 12. 
19 See note 2 supra for information about obtaining charts comparing the Mas-
sachusetts legislation with malpractice reforms in other states. 
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